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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the interaction of domestic political elites 
and external donors against the backdrop of Mozambique’s 
decentralisation process. The empirical research at national and local 
levels supports the hypothesis that informal power structures influence 
the dynamics of this interaction. Consequently, this contributes to 
an outcome of externally induced democratisation different to what 
was intended by external actors. The decentralisation process has 
been utilised by ruling domestic elites for political purposes. Donors 
have rather focused on the technical side and ignored this informal 
dimension. By analysing the diverging objectives and perceptions 
of external and internal actors, as well as the instrumentalisation of 
formal democratic structures, it becomes clear, that the ‘informal has 
to be seen as normal’. At a theoretical level, the analysis contributes to 
elite-oriented approaches of post-conflict democratisation by adding 
‘the informal’ as an additional factor for the dynamics of external-
internal interaction. At a policy level, external actors need to take 
more into account informal power structures and their ambivalence 
for state-building and democratisation.
Introduction
In the context of the third wave of democratisation, research on democratisation has 
increasingly focused on the factors that can promote or impede formal democratisation 
processes and state-building in post-conflict societies. While the state-building literature has 
emphasised the influence of external actors on the construction of democratic institutions, 
transition theories have largely neglected external actors, concentrating instead on the role 
of domestic elites.1 Recent elite oriented approaches to the study of democratic transition 
have identified the role of domestic elites and the interaction of domestic elites and external 
actors as important factors in post-conflict democratisation.2 However, insights into the 
nature and dynamics of this interaction remain scarce.3
In light of the intensifying discussion of ‘defective democracies’4 the debate on neo- 
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debate on transition.5 Within the neo-patrimonialism debate, several authors have identified 
informal power structures used by domestic elites as a decisive factor shaping democrati-
sation processes. These scholars explicitly take into account the interrelation of formal and 
informal power structures.6 However, systematic research on this issue in the context of 
post-conflict democratisation needs further attention.
More specifically, elites-oriented studies have thus far largely neglected the role of infor-
mal power structures in the interaction between domestic elites and external actors and 
the consequences thereof for externally induced democratisation processes in post-conflict 
settings. In line with the objectives of this special issue, the main argument of the pres-
ent article, therefore, is: the existence and instrumentalisation of informal power struc-
tures influences the dynamics of the interaction of external actors and domestic elites in 
post-conflict democratisation processes beyond formal negotiations, capacity-building and 
institutions. This sheds light on the phenomenon, why externally induced democratisation 
processes may work out differently than originally intended by external actors.
While proponents of neo-patrimonialism research have primarily focused on African 
countries, scholars of transition theories have placed emphasis on the countries of the former 
Eastern Bloc.7 Mozambique, a Southern African country and former socialist one-party state 
with a history of conflict and transition to peace and democratisation, represents a highly 
internationalised setting that has been profoundly influenced by external donors. It may, 
therefore, serve as a paradigmatic case for the analysis of the interaction between external 
actors and domestic elites in the context of post-conflict democratisation.
Although Mozambique was once considered a ‘donor darling’ by the international com-
munity due to its supposedly successful transition to peace8 and democratisation,9 the coun-
try’s decentralisation process as part of democratisation seems to have diverged from the 
original objectives of the donors. New clashes between the main opposition party’s militia 
(former rebel movement) and the government’s army since 2013, amongst others because of 
issues of the devolution of power and resources from central government to the provinces, 
hint at shortcomings of post-conflict democratisation in the realm of decentralisation.
Previous research has examined the development of the relationship between the 
Mozambican Government and donors on the national level;10democratisation, local gov-
ernment and conflict transformation;11the development of the decentralisation process 
and political settlement;12 the role of elections and inter- and intra-party struggle;13 local 
governance in the districts;14 and political decentralisation and municipal development 
in Mozambique.15 However, the role of informal power structures for the dynamics of the 
interaction between external actors and domestic elites at national and local levels and 
its consequences for post-conflict democratisation have not yet been explicitly addressed 
empirically.16 Whereas elites and neo-patrimonialism-oriented studies focus mainly on 
the national level, this article seeks to contribute additional insights by showing how phe-
nomena of informal power structure usage at the national level are reproduced at the local 
level. Furthermore, it takes into account the mutual perceptions of the involved actors on 
the external–internal interaction.
The main research questions, therefore, read as follows: which objectives and interests do 
external donors and domestic elites in Mozambique pursue regarding democratisation and 
decentralisation? How do the actors perceive the respective other’s objectives and acting? 
How does this influence the dynamics of their interaction and consequently the nature of 
the democratisation process?
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The empirical evidence is based on a focused ethnographic methodology of qualitative 
data collection.17 This includes more than 100 interviews with national and international 
experts as well as political, civil society, business and donor representatives at all levels of 
government that were conducted during field studies in 2009 and 2010.18 The results of the 
interviews and participant observations at the district level – specifically, in the provinces 
of Manica and Inhambane – were triangulated with secondary literature, focus group dis-
cussions as well as expert debriefings to ensure criteria of reliability and validity were met.19
Departing from further theoretical insights and an overview on the context of decen-
tralisation and donor involvement in Mozambique, the empirical analysis (1) shows which 
common and diverging objectives and interests domestic elites and external donors pursue 
within their interaction regarding the decentralisation process and how those are perceived; 
(2) addresses how domestic elites deal with the results of donor-elite interaction in terms of 
the decentralisation process and how this consequently (a) shapes the structures as well as 
(b) influences their acting within those structures, both at national and local government 
level. The conclusion then points out the ambivalence of informal power structures for the 
dynamics of external–internal interaction as contribution to further theories and policies 
of post-conflict democratisation.
Theoretical insights
The promotion of democracy and good governance by donors since the 1990s has been 
accompanied by expectations of improvements in security, economic development, the rule 
of law, the safeguarding of human rights and citizen participation.20 This includes the expec-
tation that democratisation, with the promotion of democratic institutions such as elections 
as its central condition, represents an indispensable pillar of post-conflict state-building.21 
The promotion of decentralisation is regarded as an important component of democrati-
sation and stabilisation processes in post-conflict contexts.22
However, externally induced democratisation in post-conflict settings may lead to a 
variety of perceptions and subsequent reactions by the domestic elites involved.23 Elite 
oriented approaches to the study of democratic transition have pointed out that external 
actors and domestic elites may follow different objectives.24 In practice, the implementation 
of democratic institutions might fulfil expectations and satisfy interests of domestic elites 
other than those intended by the external actors.25
This has influence on the shape of formal democratic structures. As Zürcher et al. for 
example show, domestic elites welcome the resources stemming from external actors but 
are less willing to adopt democratic norms and institutions in case they view their interests 
threatened.26 Studies on neo-patrimonialism with its strand of political clientelism con-
tribute to this debate by highlighting the role of informal power structures: ruling political 
elites using formal democratic state structures for the interest to safeguard their privileges 
and to maintain power.27 The informal dimension, however, also applies to external actors. 
Studies show that they may promote democratic institutions by acting as an additional 
power outside of domestic formal democratic decision-making structures and thus suffer 
legitimation deficits.28
Conflicting interests and objectives apply to informal influence on the shape of formal 
democratic structures as well as to the informal action of domestic elites within formal dem-
ocratic structures. Studies on post-conflict democratisation have pointed out to the aspect of 
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the willingness of domestic elites to play according to democratic rules.29 In the context of 
democratisation processes, scholars of neo-patrimonialism have observed that the state has 
been captured by elites who are primarily concerned with their own maintenance of power 
through clientelistic networks of patronage.30 Therefore, research on neo-patrimonialism 
again contributes to the debate on the interaction of external actors and domestic elites by 
highlighting the role of informal power structures, namely the clientelistic relationships of 
exchange and reciprocity, based on resources of power within formal state institutions.31 
Additionally, Migdal and Schlichte assert that many international and transnational actors 
have propped up the state as all-important mediator between global actors and the domestic 
population, enhancing domestic political elites’ power over society through the control of 
key distributional mechanisms such as foreign aid, loans and investment.32 This applies all 
the more in the context of post-conflict democratisation, with its specific challenges, such 
as peace-building, stabilisation, reconciliation and often imposed institutional structures, 
accompanied by heavy external resource input, compared to development contexts.33
One point of intersection among proponents of elites, transition and neo-patrimonialism 
research alike is the role of agency (in terms of the values, interests and objectives of the 
involved actors) in negotiations over norms and institutions.34 Additionally, some authors 
link the question of power to agency as decisive for structuring the interactions of groups 
of people.35
Taking the elite concept proposed by Higley and Burton as a starting point, elites are 
defined as
[…] persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and 
movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. 
[…] [N]ational elites can be defined as top position-holders in the largest or most resource-rich 
political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural organi-
zations and movements in a society.36
The focus of this paper is on the interaction of donors as a specific group of external actors 
and ‘political elites’ in Mozambique. Following Macuane, the latter is referring to those 
elites – representatives of political parties, the administration, the private sector, or civil 
society – who are somehow linked to the ruling party in Mozambique and have an influ-
ence on political decision-making, taking into account the blurred boundaries between 
different groups of domestic elites and various interchanges (e.g. between politicians and 
the administration).37 The empirical analysis focuses on political elites linked to the ruling 
party and donors as a specific group of external actors. Their interactions in Mozambique 
at national and local levels is analysed against the backdrop of decentralisation within the 
broader frame of democratisation.
Decentralisation generally implies the transfer of legal and political authority over plan-
ning, decision-making and administrative management from the central government to 
local administrative units, combined with the necessary transfer of resources.38 It is com-
monly differentiated according to devolution (i.e. political decentralisation) and deconcen-
tration (i.e. administrative decentralisation).39
‘Informal’ in this article applies to structures and acting that are not formally regulated 
(e.g. through contracts, rules, institutions) and that are available within and outside formal 
democratic structures. Relevant for the characterisation as informal is the respective per-
ception of structures and acting as informal by the involved actors.
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Donors and decentralisation in Mozambique
The post-conflict order in Mozambique after 10 years of struggle to liberate the country 
from Portuguese colonial rule – independence in 1974 – and 16 years of conflict between 
the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the Mozambican National Resistance 
(Renamo)40 – General Peace Accord of Rome (GPA) in 1992 and first multi-party elections 
in 1994 – has been decisively influenced by external actors.
According to the Human Development Index, Mozambique continues to number among 
the four poorest countries in the world.41 There has been an inextricable link between 
donor support for the Mozambican peace process and aid conditionality.42 The country’s 
relationship with donors has been characterised by its extreme dependency on external 
aid, amounting to about 50 per cent of the national budget.43 Over the history of donor 
involvement in Mozambique after 1992, policies and attitudes have shifted several times. 
Funding evolved from a project-based, bilateral process to budget support and increasing 
donor co-ordination (G19) in accordance with the Paris Declaration in the Programme 
Aid Partnership (PAP). This policy ties budget funding to government performance in 
accordance with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).44
The entire decentralisation process since 1994 has been dominated by the concept of 
‘gradualism’, meaning the gradual devolution of power and resources to the local level. 
The ruling elites support a dual process of administrative decentralisation – the deconcen-
tration of resources to nationally ruled districts – and democratic decentralisation – the 
devolution of political power and resources to municipalities with elected local govern-
ments (starting with 33 municipalities in 1997, extending to 43 in 2008 and to 53 in 2013). 
Thus far, no official decentralisation strategy or law has been enacted.45 On average, less 
than five per cent of Mozambique’s national expenditures are currently transferred from 
the national to the local government level (districts and municipalities).46 The legal frame 
of decentralisation consists of Law 3/94, the amendment to the Constitution of 1996, the 
Local Authority Package (Pacote Autárquico),47 and the Law of Local Organs of the State 
(LOLE), Law 08/2003, including its regulation and the guidelines on the organisation and 
functioning of the consultative councils (CCs) at the district level.48 Additionally, since 
2006, the national government has promoted a district development fund (FDD), known 
as the ‘seven million’.49 With the advent of the CCs and the FDD as part of the deconcen-
tration process, new formal decentralisation structures have been established at local level, 
offering representatives of district populations the opportunity to formally take part in local 
political decision-making processes.50 However, as experience in the field shows, a variety 
of phenomena suggest that these structures function differently than intended by donors 
in terms of promoting democratisation.51
The national level: diverging objectives, structures and instrumentalisation
Diverging objectives
The main objective of external actors such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and bilateral donors52 has been to build new institutions and support democratic 
state reform in post-conflict Mozambique.53 Within this broader frame, donors and domes-
tic elites together have promoted formal decentralisation structures with the objective to 
address questions of stabilisation, poverty reduction and participation at different levels of 
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government.54 Originally, donors mainly supported democracy and governance at the cen-
tral level – electoral processes, political parties and civil society – but the focus has shifted to 
local levels in more recent years. Decentralisation has been on the donor agenda since 1994. 
However, together with good governance, it has begun to attract additional attention from 
donors, including the G19 group of budget support donors.55 This has been a consequence 
of the perceived insufficiency of the democratic quality of the parliament and opposition 
parties, as well as the ruling party.56
National and international experts point out that the ruling political elite’s main objectives 
involve defending the historically predominant role of Frelimo and the unity of the party, 
maintaining control of the economy and promoting strategic national and international 
alliances to achieve these objectives.57 At the same time, there are external experts that 
believe that the Mozambican political elites want the population to remain poor in order 
to justify continued donor funding, especially in light of expected natural resource rents 
and diminished donor contributions to the government budget.58
While formally embracing the decentralisation process, there is widespread scepticism 
at all levels and from the perspectives of various domestic elites (politicians and the admin-
istration) regarding external influences on national policies. As one national consultant 
stated: ‘The big changes in the country came because of donor pressure (decentralisation, 
anti-corruption, good governance). But those are not our agendas. The government accepts 
it because it needs the money’.59 The donor presence has also been criticised for being overly 
paternalistic and conditional: ‘We are no longer donkeys; there is no need for programmes 
for ‘savages’’.60 An international expert in the Ministry of State Administration (Ministério 
de Administração Estatal – MAE) explained: ‘Mozambique is technically broken; it is a 
conditioned democracy’.61 Directors of Provincial Directorates voiced similar perceptions: 
‘After all, it was the Europeans that told us, ‘You have to be democrats’, that’s why we changed 
the constitution’62 and ‘They [donors] do what they want, not what we want’.63 Donors are 
accused by domestic elites of being primarily interested in their own visibility and the 
justification of their practices.64 There is also the perception on the part of domestic elites 
and external experts that donors would turn a blind eye to democratic deficits in order not 
to challenge the apparent ‘success story’ of their intervention in Mozambique.65
The interaction of donors and domestic political elites is characterised by factual and 
perceived diverging objectives. Domestic elites accuse donors of following their own inter-
ests of legitimating their continued role in post-conflict democratisation. Donors focus 
on technical issues of formal decentralisation of policies and structures ignore the hidden 
and informal objective of power maintenance by domestic elites by using decentralisation 
structures amongst others.
Shaping structures
At the national level, several authors have identified phenomena of (political) clientelism, 
limited access to decision-making and rent-seeking as part of the political elite’s strategy of 
maintaining power. Specifically, they point to the ‘partidarisation’ of the state.66 Interview 
respondents from many different backgrounds and perspectives describe the political system 
as characterised by a dominant party and blurred boundaries between the state, government, 
economy and ruling party.67 Statements by national consultants such as ‘Government is the 
state’68 and ‘The country returned to the one-party state’ are typical.69 An international expert 
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claims, ‘The state in Mozambique is detached, dominated by the political elites, instrumen-
talised and absorbed’.70 This observation is supported by independent external researchers, 
which assert that Mozambique could be labelled a de facto (not de jure) one-party state. 
According to them, this phenomenon can be traced back to two sets of informal power 
structures in Mozambique that have shaped state-party-society-economy relations at dif-
ferent levels: (1) a political culture influenced by the legacy of the one-party state and (2) 
informal arrangements of Frelimo with the major opposition party Renamo in the post-
war setting.71 Thus the blurred lines between various Mozambican political elites include 
arrangements between the leading figures of Frelimo and Renamo.72
There is growing alienation between the government and society, but the weak opposition 
allows the ruling party to dominate all spheres of society.73 There are some independent 
forces such as certain national intellectuals and the media; in general, however, the oppo-
sition, civil society, the private sector and traditional authorities have not yet effectively 
challenged the government or acted as significant change agents.74 The ruling political 
elites have managed to maintain the balance of power in their favour through a process of 
constant negotiation and circumstantial coalition-building with state and non-state actors.75 
Weimer et al. discuss this phenomenon of ‘political settlement’ by the ruling political elites 
in post-conflict Mozambique.76 Such settlements have been possible despite the influence of 
and dependency on external donors and the radical changes the country has undergone77 
due to various means such as instrumentalisation and co-optation of formal democratic 
structures to ensure compliance.78 Members of the political elites control access to and use 
of government resources including donor funds assigned for the building of democratic 
institutions, which they employ to promote the ruling party’s interests of maintaining power 
as well as personal ones – following partisan, ethnic, regional or kinship criteria.79
The decentralisation process in Mozambique falls in line with the above described interest 
of the ruling political elites of maintaining power. Decentralisation was not part of the 1992 
GPA signed by Frelimo and Renamo, but the process has been negotiated and implemented 
since 1994 with the support of external donors. On the side of domestic political elites, 
decentralisation was formally accepted primarily because of the need for stabilisation and 
economic recovery. However, from the very beginning, there has also been resistance within 
the ruling domestic elites to an excessively far-reaching political decentralisation process 
that could constitute a threat to their hold on power and to national unity.80
Although donors tried to push for a more comprehensive model of political decentrali-
sation involving all government levels, the Frelimo government elites succeeded in limiting 
decentralisation to a dual and gradual process,81 and in shaping its implementation in prac-
tice. This has resulted in a system of governance that runs at two different speeds.82 Political 
decentralisation is limited to selected municipalities that have been granted the status of 
autonomous local government (autarquia) and hold regular elections for the municipal 
president, council and assembly.83 Deconcentration primarily involves the decentralisation 
of tasks and limited power, but scarcely any fiscal decentralisation. The ‘deconcentrated’ 
districts with their localities and administrative posts continue to operate under central 
government rule with centrally appointed district administrators.
Weimer highlights the ‘critical juncture’ of the peace process of 1990–1994 and the stra-
tegic choice made by the ruling elites to redefine the initial model of decentralisation into 
a two-pronged model of devolution and deconcentration. This entailed high political and 
administrative costs, producing two classes of citizens and opening the door for future 
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re-centralisation. Weimer concludes that decentralisation is merely ‘part of the game’ as 
long as it can be informally instrumentalised by political elites to distribute rents to local 
‘clients’ via deconcentration and thus to secure the political and economic predominance 
of the ruling party.84 Plagemann argues that the discrepancy between the formal planned 
decentralisation supported by donors and the informal implementation by domestic political 
elites ultimately created unstable formal democratic institutions.85 The result is an informal 
recentralisation process taking place within a formal decentralisation framework.86
While accepting the externally introduced decentralisation process as such, political 
domestic elites succeed in shaping formal decentralisation structures according to their 
interests of maintaining power. Donors turn a blind eye on the persistence of informal 
structures of the former one-party state used to side-line formal structures of democrati-
sation and decentralisation. This indicates how the ruling domestic elites have managed 
to maintain and extend their power base – a far cry from what was originally intended by 
donors promoting democratisation together with domestic elites in post-conflict settings.
Informal acting within formal structures
Within the system of deconcentration, the CCs and especially the FDD are widely regarded 
as political instruments of the ruling party used to strengthen its electoral support at the 
district level.87 The process has not been implemented as originally intended by the admin-
istration of the Ministry for Planning and Development: ‘It got politically hijacked’.88 There 
is the widespread opinion that the introduction of the ‘seven million’ [FDD] has contributed 
significantly (but not exclusively) to Frelimo’s local electoral victories in 2009, even in former 
opposition strongholds.89
These criticisms with regard to the CCs and the FDD have been voiced not only among 
the oppositional and administrative elites but also among donors.90 Some external donors 
have resisted supporting the FDD, arguing amongst other that the government may not act 
as banker. Furthermore, donors suspect that these funds have been misappropriated from 
donor budget support, side-lining formal procedures. Unease with the FDD and allegations 
of fraud during the elections led to a ‘donor strike’ at the beginning of 2010, in which the 
G19 withheld budget support.91 This serves as an example of a case in which the national 
political elites have ignored donor preferences and external donors themselves have not 
spoken with one voice.92
Domestic political elites may formally welcome donor activities, but empirical evidence 
shows, however, that donors themselves are perceived by the domestic political elites to act 
informally in the sense of an additional sociopolitical force existing outside formal dem-
ocratic structures.93 National political elites in Mozambique have been more accountable 
to external donors than to their own parliament and population. This kind of informal 
influence may run counter to the unconsolidated Mozambican democracy by reducing the 
space for participation of the parliament and civil society.94
Furthermore, there are critical questions regarding the adequacy and sustainability of the 
implementation of donor-influenced and -supported decentralisation programmes. Due 
to donors’ shifting priorities (e.g. municipal versus district level) and the fragmentation of 
decentralisation programmes (island projects), the carrying out of such programmes often 
is seen as unsustainable projects that can lead to informal parallel structures.95
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International and domestic scholars have suggested that the decentralisation process as 
a whole might fail because of the resistance of the political elites and because of the donors’ 
focus on the technical side, ignoring informal power structures and the political nature of 
decentralisation.96 By strengthening the state capacity, donors also strengthen the ruling 
party’s grip on the state: ‘Decentralisation will continue to be an avenue for the party state 
to extend and consolidate control over territory, people, and resources, and also a means 
to increase its legitimacy’.97
External donors also often lack consciousness about the political instrumentalisation by 
domestic elites within formal structures of decentralisation, such as clientelism. In case they 
get aware of those, there are single examples of donor reactions, for example the ‘donor-
strike’. However, in the end the formal structures, like for example the CCs, continue to get 
external support. Domestic elites in turn perceive external donors as acting informal, in the 
sense of side-lining formal democratic structures, such as the parliament. This perceived 
legitimation deficit of donors may contribute consciously or unconsciously to resistance to 
externally introduced democratisation by domestic elites.
The local level: diverging objectives, instrumentalisation and change
Diverging objectives and structures
At the local district level, donors have established and supported a variety of decentralised 
formal structures with the objective to enhance democratisation.98 There have been sev-
eral years of ‘island’ donor projects of CCs in selected districts, especially in the north of 
the country. With the introduction of LOLE, the Mozambican government has followed 
donor objectives and issued a directive to introduce the CCs as a formal space of local 
governance in all districts at the respective levels – locality, administrative post and seat of 
district government.
These CCs are composed of leading local figures that are tasked with discussing and 
approving the district economic and social development plan (PESOD) and to decide on 
the allocation of resources of the FDD.99 Currently, the CCs use the fund to dole out small 
credits for local projects of food production and job creation, submitted by individual local 
citizens or associations.100 The FDD is perceived as political instrument to enhance the ruling 
political elites power at the local level, as well, by donors and local experts.101
While implementing the CCs as formal decentralisation structures at the local level, the 
representatives of domestic political elites in the provincial and district secretariats complain 
that the entire decentralisation process has been donor-imposed.102 In the local context, 
too, donors get perceived to pursue their own interests. As a national consultant at district 
level points out: ‘The international organisations also do not have an interest in changing 
the situation; they want to secure their own existence’.103
Domestic political elites have taken up donor introduced local decentralisation struc-
tures, such as the CCs and integrated them in national policies. However, local formal 
decentralisation structures, too, get used for the maintenance of power of the ruling political 
elites, as the FDD shows. Again, donor objectives are also perceived by domestic elites as 
following self-interests apart from the formal objective of promoting decentralisation and 
democratisation.
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Informal acting within formal structures
CC representatives linked to the ruling political elites use their own direct informal chan-
nels within and outside the CC to influence decision-making in their favour. Although 
formally established above party lines,104 party-politicisation plays a role when it comes to 
membership, access and resources concerning CCs and the FDD.
Despite the existence of formal criteria to promote democratic participation, CC 
members are often selected according to the preferences of the district administrator.105 
Statements such as ‘We appoint the people democratically’106 or ‘We know whom to select’ 
are symptomatic.107 Criticism is seen as attack, and there is a deliberate exclusion of mem-
bers of opposition parties. As one district official stated, the goal of CCs and the FDD is to 
‘help the party … I mean, the government!’108 There is also indirect exclusion, as the local 
population tends to choose representatives for CCs whom they expect to have the most 
influence on the ruling government – hence, those linked to the ruling political elites.109 
The language, symbols and way of applauding in CCs stem from the one-party-state era.110 
The notion of ‘we and the others’,111 referring to the ruling party and the former militia, now 
the main opposition party, prevails. Representatives of the ruling party often have more 
influence and power than elected representatives. They take part in local decision-making 
processes despite their lack of a formal mandate.112 Respondents accordingly speak of the 
‘partidarisation’ of the state.113
In addition to the distribution of privileges, control, sanctions and fear are also used as 
informal political instruments to discourage participation.114 Numerous accounts describe 
people receiving FDD credit because of personal and party relationships, not because of 
merit or the viability of their project proposal.115 As one district official stated: ‘The money 
[FDD] does not satisfy a majority, but a certain group, that’s logical’.116
Donors support the CCs via technical assistance by supplying operational costs, infra-
structure and consultancy at provincial and district levels. The empirical evidence shows a 
somewhat ambivalent interrelationship in terms of the attitudes towards and perceptions 
of donors by the political elites at the local level. The support of donors is acknowledged 
by political elites, as otherwise the CCs would not function properly.117 However, there are 
examples of CC sessions not taking place because ‘we depend on [donor X] to be able to 
hold the CC session’.118 This raises questions regarding the dependency on and sustaina-
bility of external intervention.119 Nevertheless, the donor staff is also perceived positively 
by domestic elites as serving as an informal broker (without formal mandate) between the 
local and provincial/central government and between the sectoral ministries involved.120
Respondents bemoan the fact that donors have been excessively technocratic and focused 
on the technical side of implementing local decentralisation structures, as well as their use 
of overly ambitious impact indicators oriented toward donor interests of legitimising their 
actions.121 Other respondents criticise the fact that donors have created informal parallel 
support structures that are not formally integrated into existing state structures – e.g. tech-
nical councils at the provincial level to advise the CCs.122 However, some informal structures 
established by donors, such as thematic working commissions within the CCs, have later 
been included in the official national guidelines for the functioning of CCs.123 There have 
been donor attempts to increase the accountability of the district administration towards its 
population. In practice, however, the accountability of political elites is directed at donors 
and higher government levels rather than the local population at the local level, as well.124
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At the local level, as well, external donors focus mainly on technical issues and largely 
ignore (party-political) clientelism used within formal decentralisation structures for the 
purpose to enhance the ruling political elite’s power maintenance. However, there are exam-
ples of local informally implemented features within formal CC structures by the action 
of individual donor representatives that got adapted by domestic elites and integrated in 
national policies.
Winds of change
Despite the challenges described above, however, the CCs and the FDD have also had 
positive effects in terms of promoting local democratic processes. For the first time, dis-
tricts have formally institutionalised spaces for participation and at least some degree of 
autonomy regarding the use of resources. As a high-ranking official in the MAE stated, the 
‘seven million’ was foremost a courageous instrument of the ruling elites. According to him, 
despite the acknowledged technical failures, the pedagogic effect at the local level has been 
decisive in increasing commitment to participation: ‘It is a democratic process, but not in 
the European sense’.125 The consultation of the population has become obligatory. Thanks 
to CCs at various local levels, localities perceive the broader picture of the priorities within 
the district. Members of the CCs speak of more self-awareness and new possibilities to raise 
issues. Their commitment is evident as they for example endure long commutes to partic-
ipate in CC sessions. There is also the potential to increase pressure on local government 
from the grass-roots level.126 As a foreign technical advisor at the Ministry for Planning and 
Development explained, the CCs might not be a substitute for far-reaching local democ-
racy in the sense of elected district governments; however, as long as democratic elections 
at the district level are not on the political agenda, it is good to have at least some form of 
participation in the meantime.127 The FDD functions as a strong incentive for participation, 
as decisions are taken concerning tangible projects.128
In summary, the CCs and the FDD can be manipulated and instrumentalised by local 
domestic elites. This is accomplished by using informal power structures such as personal 
and party relationships to influence local decision-making processes. Even though their 
intention is to support democratisation, donors fail to prevent the ruling political elites 
from co-opting formalised structures and using them to maintain their hold on power. The 
varying and ambivalent dynamics of interactions between donors and domestic elites found 
at the local level in terms of diverging objectives, shaping formal democratic structures and 
instrumentalising them from within reflect the findings at the national level. However, CCs 
also contribute to raising awareness of participation and accountability opportunities, even 
though they might not function as donors intended.
Conclusion: informal power structures influence the dynamics of external-
internal interaction
After 10 years of struggle for independence and 16 years of ‘civil war’, Mozambique has 
embraced a path of democratisation with the support of external donors. Within this pro-
cess, decentralisation has been promoted by domestic elites and external donors as one 
element of addressing broader objectives of stability, state-building and democratisation. 
However, empirical evidence at the national and local levels and specifically with reference 
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to the decentralisation process shows that diverging objectives and informal power struc-
tures influence the dynamics of the interactions of domestic elites and donors. They affect 
the shape of as well as the acting within formal decentralisation structures and influence, 
consequently, the nature of democratisation processes.
Agency in terms of the values, interests and objectives of the domestic elites and exter-
nal actors involved is used to negotiate norms and institutions at a formal level, but the 
question of power affects this interaction also at the informal level. As soon as the actors 
involved perceive the actions of the respective ‘other’ as informal, the use of informal power 
structures becomes even more frequent – it is seen as normal. This has consequences at 
both theoretical and practical levels:
In line with the empirical evidence, informal power structures become manifest at var-
ious levels:
(1) Domestic political elites formally agreed to externally induced decentralisation after 
the GPA of 1992, but have transformed the formal decentralisation structures according 
to their own informal political objectives of maintaining power. They have managed to 
do so by resisting far-reaching political decentralisation policies at the national level and 
by co-opting formally institutionalised spaces of participation at the local level. In light 
of the blurred boundaries between the state, government, ruling party, private sector and 
civil society, political elites use both, formal and informal means of access, resources and 
relationships to influence decision-making within formal decentralised structures of dem-
ocratic participation.
(2) Domestic political elites’ perception of external interference is ambivalent. Formally 
they accept co-operation with donors, donor-funding is welcomed; informally, however, 
there are many voices that perceive external intervention such as donor-funded decentrali-
sation programmes as imposed, paternalistic, unsustainable, lacking adequacy and account-
ability and as reinforcing dependencies. Domestic elites tolerate external intervention as 
long as the maintenance of their power is not questioned through the implementation of 
formal structures of decentralisation.
(3) Donors are perceived by domestic elites as an additional political force influencing 
government policies. Furthermore, external donors are perceived as pursuing their own 
interests, such as visibility and providing the image of a functioning peace and democrati-
sation process. Donor influence (e.g. the G19) on the national level is perceived as mostly 
taking place outside the countries’ formal democratic structures and therefore exhibits legit-
imation deficits; however, this is seen as normal. These perceptions may serve as argument 
for the use of informal means of side-lining and co-opting formal structures of decentrali-
sation – not only as deliberate strategy but also, consequently, as reaction by domestic elites 
to externally induced democratisation and the acting of donors.
(4) Donors do not sufficiently take into account the use of informal power structures by 
domestic elites when it comes to shaping decentralisation structures. They do not prevent 
the domestic elites’ instrumentalisation of the decentralisation process for their objective 
of maintenance of power. Therefore, processes of democratisation may function different to 
‘Western’ approaches intended and introduced by external donors. Yet, there are members 
of the domestic political that share common objectives of democratisation. Those need to 
be identified and supported as change-agents by donors.
(5) Especially the analysis at the local level shows that the establishment of formal decen-
tralisation structures and incentives for participation, such as the CCs and the FDD, may 
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contribute to increased awareness and pressure from below. This may lead to a change of 
perceptions and attitudes of the involved actors. Consequently, there may be increasingly 
change-agents at different government levels conciliating the objectives of domestic elites 
and external donors and modifying decentralisation structures from within towards more 
space for democratic participation in the long run.
At a theoretical level, these findings correspond with discussions in elite-centred transi-
tion studies on the importance of taking diverging objectives, as well as the perceptions and 
attitudes of domestic elites into account in post-conflict democratisation processes. These 
findings furthermore are in accordance with approaches of neo-patrimonialism, especially 
those linked to the micro-level of acting, such as (political) clientelism and rent-seeking. 
They also reflect discussions in the literature on the deliberate use of informality and on 
how donors may even support domestic elites’ strategies of power maintenance. Thus this 
article contributes to elites-centred theories on post-conflict democratisation by showing 
that additional insights are gained when the informal dimensions gets taken into account 
in analysing the dynamics of the interaction between domestic elites and external actors. 
Additionally, there are indications that this analysis could also be further linked to the 
broader discussion of authoritarian regime legitimation and the maintenance of power, 
specifically with regard to the role that interactions with external actors play in the legiti-
mation strategies of domestic elites in post-conflict settings.129 Further empirical research 
is needed to substantiate this argument.
At policy level, the normal of the informal constitutes a general phenomenon that should 
not be neglected by external actors with regard to democratisation in post-conflict societies. 
The formal consensus (Higley) between domestic elites and external actors on post-con-
flict democratisation, therefore, should not be thwarted by an informal consensus on the 
perpetuation of mutual dependency-structures of domestic elites and external actors or by 
diverging objectives regarding the implementation of formal democratic structures.
The ‘informal’ does not necessarily have to limit state-building and democratisation. It 
seems to be normal and functional for stakeholders – politicians, civil society, the private 
sector and donors – to use informal structures of influence. The interrelationship between 
formal and informal is ambivalent, and the two are mutually dependent. Development prac-
titioners in particular must reflect on why this is the case: it may be due to the weakness of 
formal structures, or the practical experience of more room for manoeuvre to assert one’s 
interests or those of one’s group. Informal decisions may be taken to the formal realm to 
be legitimised. There is an evident recourse to informal processes when formal structures 
are not regarded as effective and do not facilitate certain decision-making procedures. Any 
analysis of the interaction between external actors and domestic elites beyond the case of 
Mozambique should examine who has access to informal means and power structures, 
whether such instruments are used for the benefit of democratisation, and what might 
be the intended and unintended impacts in terms of development for the majority of the 
population.
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